Understanding Islamic diplomacy— the doctrine called Al Taqiyya

 Students of history have been puzzled by the habit of Muslim leaders going back on their solemn promises and even signed statements even before the ink could dry. Two examples may be cited from the recent history of India— the promise by Muhammad Ali Jinnah to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan for an undivided India in 1946 and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s all but repudiation of the 1972 Shimla Agreement signed in the immediate aftermath of Pakistan’s defeat in the Bangladesh War of 1971. Both were soon broken, but of the two, Jinnah’s flip-flop is more illustrative of a fundamental principle of Islamic politics called al taqiyya.

Partition: Jinnah’s flip-flop

We may first look at Jinnah’s supposed acceptance of the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan for an undivided India with considerable local autonomy for the states. While nominally accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan, Jinnah told his followers that this acceptance did not mean the end of the struggle for Pakistan and they should see it as a giant step in that direction and continue their struggle until Pakistan was achieved. On 6 June 1946, i.e. a day after Jinnah’s advice to the Muslim League to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, the resolution adopted by the Muslim League Council reiterated its demand for a sovereign State of Pakistan and said that it remained its unalterable object.

Jinnah’s stark duplicity stares one in the face— seemingly accepting the Cabinet Mission plan of a Federal Union one day while continuing the demand for a separate and sovereign Pakistan the very next. How is this possible— acceptance of a plan for a united India while continuing the struggle for the division of the country to form a Pakistan? It is not hard to see that his ‘acceptance’ was purely a public relations gesture and he had no intention of honoring it once the deal was signed.

It was the same with Bhutto when he signed the Shimla Agreement with Indira Gandhi to gain the release of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers held by India, which Bangladesh wanted to try as war criminals. To make sense of such extraordinary exercise one must go beyond ordinary politics and look into Islamic political theory. It comes under what Islamic scholars call al taqiyya, the tactic of taking a temporary stand with the intention of breaking it when a convenient opportunity arises. It is a vital principle of Islamic war and diplomacy that is virtually unknown to non-Muslims dealing with Muslim adversaries.

With regard to the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan, a fact that stares us in the face is— Jinnah’s acceptance of the Cabinet Plan for a federal union was not made in good faith. While nominally accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan, Jinnah told his followers that this acceptance did not mean the end of the struggle for Pakistan and they should see it as a “giant step in that direction and continue their struggle until Pakistan was achieved.” On 6 June 1946, i.e. a day after Jinnah’s advice to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, the resolution adopted by the Muslim League Council reiterated its demand for a sovereign State of Pakistan and said that it remained its unalterable object.

To make sense of this extraordinary exercise one must go beyond ordinary politics and look into Islamic political theory. It comes under what Islamic scholars call al taqiyya, the tactic of taking a temporary stand with the intention of breaking it when a convenient opportunity arises. It is a vital principle of Islamic war and diplomacy that is virtually unknown to non-Muslims dealing with Muslim adversaries.

 The doctrine of Al taqiyya

The Dictionary of Islam defines Al Taqiyah (or al taqiyya) as meaning: Literally “Guarding oneself, a Shia’h doctrine. A pious fraud: a Shia’h Muslim believes he is justified either smoothing down or in denying the peculiarities of his religious belief, in order to save himself from religious persecution.”

Jinnah was of course a Shia’h (as was Bhutto) but this explanation first published in 1885 doesn’t do full justice to the scope and power of al taqiyya. The more recent Faith Freedom Network is more explicit and does not limit the doctrine to Shi’ahs escaping persecution:

Al-taqiyya and dissimulation refer to the practice of Muslims blatantly lying to non-Muslims, but the principal goes beyond mere lying for propaganda purposes. In accordance with this license to deceive, during time of weakness the Quran allows Muslims to have both a declared agenda and a secret agenda. The theological principle of Taqiyya means hiding one’s true beliefs and intentions to confuse one’s adversaries and enable mujahedeen to operate freely amongst enemies. The word comes from a root meaning “to guard against, to keep (oneself)”. From the verb Ittaqu, it means linguistically to ‘dodge the threat’. In this vein, a Muslim, if necessary, may eat pork, drink alcohol, and even verbally deny the Islamic faith, as long as it is with the tongue only, and he does not “mean it in his heart”. A believer is taught he can make any statement as long as the ‘heart is comfortable’. If the end result of the lie is perceived by the Muslim to be good for Islam or useful to bringing someone to “submission” to Allah, then pretty much any lie or act can be sanctioned. Indeed it is common practice for Muslims, especially leaders, to lie about any war or conflict involving Muslims vs. non-Muslims. [Sic: For the record Jinnah did both eat pork and drink alcohol.]
In plain English it is called making a promise in bad faith with every intention of breaking it at one’s convenience. It is clear from the passage that Jinnah was engaging in al taqiyya when he agreed to the Cabinet Mission proposal. It is also clear from his own words that he had no intention of honoring his word once a suitable opportunity presented itself, which is exactly what he did on the pretext of a press statement by Nehru. (Incidentally, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also, when he signed the Shimla Agreement in 1972, did so in the spirit of al taqiyya.)

In this context it is important to dispel a popular myth— that Jinnah was a ‘secular’ person and not a believing Muslim. This is far removed from the truth.   Jinnah followed a secular profession, law, but that did not make him a secular person, if by that we mean one who rejected religion. He was not an orthodox Muslim, but did follow an obscure Shia’h sect to which he remained true. Jinnah’s family belonged to the Ismaili Khoja branch of Shi’a Islam, but Jinnah later converted to Twelver Shi’a Islam, an obscure Shia’h sect. By indulging in pork and imbibing alcohol, he was not breaking the rules of his version of Islam, but only of orthodox Islam of which he was not a follower. He remained true to his version of Islam, or as al taqiyya ordains, to be ‘true in heart’.

Jinnah’s violation of orthodox rules, which by the way did not constitute violation according to his beliefs, does not mean he was irreligious. Jinnah remained a Muslim all his life. He attended service at a Shia’h mosque in Mumbai. When he married a Parsi woman (Rattanbai), the daughter of Dinshaw Petit, he took her to the mosque and had her converted to his religion. This, along with the fact that he himself voluntarily converted from the Islmaili Khoja branch to Twelver Shia’h Islam as an adult, shows that he took his religion seriously. So, ‘in his heart’ he was as much a Muslim as the most orthodox Maulana.

This also means that his brand of Islam allowed him to break the rules of orthodox Islam while remaining true to Islam ‘in his heart’. In particular, it allowed him to engage in al taqiyya in his dealings with non-Muslims. This understanding is crucial in judging his actions. Jaswant Singh shows no hint of any of this.

urther, he disowned his only daughter Dina when she married a Parsi. In the face of all this it cannot seriously be argued that Jinnah was secular in the sense he was irreligious. In any event, actions always speak louder than words, and all through his life he was a representative of Muslims though his equations with Muslim and non-Muslim leaders changed. Even when he was supposedly the ambassador of ‘Hindu-Muslim unity’ he was being one as a Muslim and not as one beyond the pale of religion. And he resorted to the time honored Islamic diplomacy of al taqiyya when the need and occasion arose.

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